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Abstract: Even if both the health and the educational 
sector are under the state supervision in basically all 
countries, there are wide differences in the mix of their 
public/private provision and financing across them. The 
debate on the proper mix between private and public 
involvement has also been re-enlightened by the recent 
financial crisis which has stressed many countries’ public 
finances. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it aims 
at presenting the incentive and competition mechanisms 
both for the public and the private sector behind different 
types of mix between private and public involvement 
according to the industrial organization design of the 
health and the educational sector. Second, the paper 
aims at presenting some recent case studies on Public 
Private Partnerships in both the health and the 
educational sector in countries such as the UK, the 
USA, the Netherlands, and Australia. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Given the macroeconomic set-up, in the next 
years, Italy will have to go on to ensure a fiscal 
discipline in order to be able to fulfill the 
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objectives established by the EU (Banca 
d’Italia, 2013). This implies that also the public 
sector for health and education will have to be 
organized by taking into account strong 
financial constraints. This will call for 
increasing the level of efficiency in providing 
health and educational services, but without 
reducing the attention to equity considerations 
that are so important in these specific kinds of 
public intervention. In this respect, Giarda 
(2011) notes that, in Italy, in the last thirty 
years, although total public expenditure for 
Collective goods remained almost the same 
(40,9% in 1980 and 41,4% in 2009), there has 
been a switch of public resources from the 
educational to the health sector: public 
expenditures for health have increased from 
29,7% in 1980 to 33,8% in 2009 while public 
expenditures for education have reduced from 
25,7% in 1980 to 20% in 2009. This of course 
reflects the demographic changes that we had 
in the period under consideration, but it can 
also be linked to the political changes 
concerning such sectors. The health sector 
moved from being under the national 
government supervision to being under the 
supervision of regional governments while the 
educational sector is basically still under the 
central government supervision. 
Starting from now and forwards the next years, 
both the health and the educational sectors will 
have to face new challenges in order to be able 
to guarantee the economic sustainability of 
   
 
 
92 
public intervention in both sectors without 
worsening in terms of equity of access and 
quality of the services provided to the 
population. In this respect, it can be helpful to 
analyze some contributions on the mix 
between public and private financing-provision 
of both health and educational services, and to 
examine recent reforms on such a mix that 
occurred in some countries. Such reforms are 
manly devoted to introduce competition and 
economic incentives even in the public side of 
the two sectors. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, 
we briefly review the main reasons that justify a 
public intervention both in the health and the 
educational sector. In section 3, we present the 
most important features of the industrial 
organization and institutional design of the 
health sector while, in section 4, we present 
some evidence on two countries, The 
Netherlands and Australia, where recent 
reforms have introduced a new design of the 
public-private split in the financing-provision 
of health care services. Section 5 illustrates the 
main characteristics of the industrial 
organization and institutional design of the 
educational sector, while section 6 presents 
evidence on the mix between public-private 
financing-production in the educational sector 
with respect to three case studies, England, The 
United States and The Netherlands. Finally, 
section 7 contains some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2 EFFICIENCY-EQUITY TRADE-OFF OF 
PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN THE HEALTH-
CARE AND THE EDUCATIONAL SECTORS 
In the main industrialized countries, the health 
and the educational sector represent a 
meaningful share of (private and public) 
aggregate expenditure with respect to GDP 
(Table 1). However, the role of public 
intervention is quite different independently of 
the results and performance in terms of 
efficient resources allocation and of fulfilling 
the citizens’ needs. 
According to normative public economics, 
although health and education are considered 
private goods, both of them share peculiarities 
that justify a public intervention on efficiency 
other than equity grounds.3 First, health care 
and education are multi-dimensional services. 
Health care includes all those goods and 
services aiming at improving health or 
preventing its deterioration, such as primary 
and specialized health care, hospitalization, and 
pharmaceuticals. Education does not only 
spread know-how and abilities, but it also 
promote socialization, and guarantee custody 
where, of course, the importance of each 
feature changes with respect to the educational 
level. 
                                                 
3 For surveys on this point, see, for example, Cutler and 
Zeckauser (2000) and Hurley (2000) for the health 
sector, and Checchi (2005) for the education sector. 
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Table 1. Expenditure on health and education as a percentage of GDP (2010) 
Countries Total 
health 
expenditure 
Public 
health 
expenditure 
Private 
health 
expenditure 
Total 
education 
expenditure 
Public 
education 
expenditure 
Private 
education 
expenditure 
France 11.9 9.0 2.7 6.3 5.8 0.5 
Germany 11.9 8.9 2.7 5.3 (2009) 4.5 (2009) 0.8 (2009) 
Italy 9.3 7.4 1.9 4.7 4.3 0.4 
Netherlands 12.0 9.6 1.6 6.3 5.4 0.9 
Spain 9.6 7.1 2.5 5.6 4.8 0.8 
UK 9.6 8.0 1.6 6.5 5.9 0.6 
Australia 8.7 (2008) 5.9 (2008) 2.8 (2008) 6.1 4.6 1.5 
USA 17.4 (2009) 8.3 (2009) 9.1 (2009) 7.3 5.1 2.2 
OECD 
average 
9.6 6.9 2.7 6.3 5.4 0.9 
EU average 9.0 (EU27) 6.5 (EU27) 2.4 (EU27) 6.0 (EU21) 5.5 (EU21) 0.5 (EU21) 
Source: OECD (2013) Education at Glance, OECD (2012, 2011) Health at Glance. 
Second, both health care and education are 
experience goods: consumers learn about the 
nature and the quality of such goods only after 
consumption.  
Given such peculiarities, on equity grounds, 
health care and education can be considered 
merit goods, thus justifying a paternalistic 
public intervention superimposing policy-
makers’ preferences to individual ones. Further, 
both health care and education are also 
recognized by many modern Constitutions as 
primary rights which should be granted 
universally independently from the working of 
the market. 
Most importantly, the peculiarities of health 
and education justify a public intervention on 
efficiency grounds. First, both goods are 
characterized by positive externalities. In the 
health sector, the option-value of some health-
care services is an externality, and more 
generally a public intervention should ensure an 
efficient provision of health care to counter 
communicable diseases passed either directly 
among humans or indirectly through the 
physical environment. In the education sector, 
positive externalities arise within the family, the 
labour market, and more generally within the 
social set-up, thus positively affecting economic 
growth.  Even if empirical investigations on the 
extent of such externalities are difficult to carry 
on, it seems that such an extent tends to 
decrease with respect to the increase of the 
educational level, thus providing policy 
implications for the proper mix between public 
and private financing. Second, for both health 
care and education, a sole private provision 
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would lead to lack of supply or monopolistic supply 
on some non-profitable areas, and further such 
inefficiency would be amplified by cream-
skimming possibilities. Third, borrowing 
capabilities of individuals are constrained by 
credit market imperfections, which do not allow to 
finance the efficient level of investment in 
education or of medical expenditures. Finally, 
both the health and the educational markets are 
characterized by asymmetric information problems. 
In health insurance markets, market failures 
arise because of informational asymmetries 
concerning the demand for health care and the 
effectiveness of medical treatments, typically of 
the form of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Similarly, in the labour market, adverse 
selection creates inefficiencies which can partly 
be countered by signaling and screening 
devices provided by education. 
In sum, equity and efficiency concerns offer 
the rationale for public intervention in terms of 
public provision of both health and educational 
services, i.e. by funding them outside price-
setting independently on the nature and 
ownership of the providers. Public provision of 
such services is however a distinct concept with 
respect to their public production, and 
industrialized countries have experienced 
various organizational and financial models. Even if 
the two concepts are of course linked each 
other, industrially organizing and funding a 
health care system or an educational system are 
two different issues and two different 
economic problems, although, of course, linked 
each other. 
In this respect, we can immediately stress the 
fact that, for some services, “industrial 
configuration failures” may occur so that it is 
socially desirable to join together public provision 
and public production. For example, in order to 
guarantee a fair territorial distribution of 
supply, the public sector should be engaged 
both to funding and to providing the services. 
This may occur whenever local monopolies can 
easily take place for extracting spatial rents: for 
instance, it may be convenient to localize 
services provision in urban areas where there 
are economies of scale, and the private returns 
to invested capital are higher. Alternatively, the 
inadequacy of supply and the rationale for a 
public production may also arise whenever an 
excess-demand of services results because of 
lower expected returns, and thus a scarce 
network of providers or whenever there are 
numerous private providers which, however, 
supply low-quality services. In these cases of 
inefficient industrial organization, a well-
organized public production is justified both on 
efficiency and equity grounds. 
3 HEALTH SECTOR: INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPETITION MECHANISMS 
3.1 Types of mixed systems 
Different models of a health care system can be 
defined with respect to the provider-producer 
split (Petretto 2013). The two extreme 
organizational cases are the Pure Public system 
and the Private insurance system. The purest 
version of the former is the so-called Beveridgean 
model which is based on full public provision 
through general taxation, and public 
production, as for example, the English and the 
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Italian National Health Systems before the 
reforms of the last two decades. Another 
public model is the so-called Bismarkian model, 
i.e. the original social insurance model where 
public Health Funds are directly financed by 
health contributions. In principle, both 
Beveridgian and Bismarkian models are 
universalistic ones. The Private insurance system is 
instead based on private insurance companies. 
The U.S. health system resembles such an 
organizational structure even if, especially after 
the Barack Obama’s reform, it is going to be 
transformed into a mixed system (Sullivan, 
2010).4 Nowadays, all European countries have 
mixed systems where public and private programs 
are acting simultaneously for guaranteeing an 
universalistic provision of health services while 
the two extreme models can by now be 
considered as academic curiosities. 
In order to distinguish several types of mixed 
systems, we have to consider some features. 
First, we need to specify what is meant by 
degree of health care coverage, keeping in mind 
that this concept is not unique as it may be 
                                                 
4 The U.S. health system has few public programs for 
specific categories of patients: Medicare for elderly people 
(over 65 years-old) and Medicaid for poor people 
(selected by means testing). The recent Obama’s reform 
1) has introduced some measures for protecting the 
insured individuals against rent seeking behaviours of 
insurance companies; 2) has created a publicly regulated 
market where several insurance companies competitively 
supply bundles of homogeneous services according to 
some common rules; 3) has obliged all citizens to buy a 
health insurance, providing tax allowances and benefits 
for those individuals or firms unable to pay for the 
premia; 4) has created a sort of “new insurance exchange 
model” which should be financed by general taxation, and 
with expected efficiency gains coming from a higher 
competition among insurance companies. 
referred to: i) the extent of coverage, i.e. the 
share of population whom health care is 
guaranteed; ii) the depth of coverage, i.e. the 
number and the features of services included in 
the insured package; iii) the highness of coverage, 
i.e. the fraction of treatment costs directly 
financed by the insurer or the National Health 
Service, and then not directly paid by patients. 
Second, we need to specify the criteria 
according to which the general practitioner (the 
agent who makes the order of purchasing the 
service) is assigned to each household. Third, it 
is important the degree of individual freedom 
in selecting the health care provider. Fourth, 
we need to specify the ways of paying the 
providers, i.e. if production costs are covered 
ex-post, or if an ex-ante budget is fixed, or if a 
system of prospective standardised tariffs for 
each treatment is in place. Finally, mixed 
systems may differ with respect to the forms of 
organizing the supply of drugs, the ways their 
prices are determined, and finally the ways co-
payments and coinsurance rates are designed. 
On the basis of these criteria, three main types 
of mixed systems can be identified: the 
reimbursement model, the integrated model, and the 
contractual model. Under the first one, insurance 
companies or decentralised health districts (or 
regional governments) reimburse patients for 
health expenditures which they have paid at 
administered prices to both public and private 
providers. Under the second one, a unique 
connected public structure is built between the 
health district and the health care providers. 
Patients have a low degree of freedom in 
selecting the provider, and do not have to pay 
the cost of the health services which are 
financed by taxes. Further, hospitals and clinics 
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are financed by referring to the costs of inputs 
or, sometimes, to a fixed budget. Under the 
third system, the funding body, the insurer or 
the health district, is separated from the public 
or private providers which are committed and 
rewarded according to a procurement contract 
with prices which, in most cases, are fixed ex-
ante and standardised along the system of 
Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG). 
Consumers-patients usually can choose the 
provider and the general practitioner they 
prefer. A peculiar type of such contractual 
models are quasi-markets, i.e. managed or 
internal competition. 
3.2 Vertical separation versus vertical 
integration 
In order to analyse such an organizational set-
up, notice that a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for creating competition in the health 
care industry is the vertical separation of 
purchasing structures from providers. The 
alternative option is to have instead a vertical 
integration between them. In order to ascertain 
which option is better than the other, we need 
to perform a cost-benefit analysis of the two 
options with respect to production costs, 
economies of scale and scope, network and 
coordination economies. In doing this, we need 
to take into account some different features of 
the two options. In particular, under vertical 
separation, the exchange between a buyer, e.g. a 
health district, and a seller, e.g. a hospital, can 
be realized via a contract while, under vertical 
integration, via an internal transfer within a 
unitary body. In other words, we face the usual 
alternative between hierarchy and market, by 
comparing the administrative costs of 
managing a complex structure (the firm), to the 
costs for signing incomplete contracts with the 
providers (the market). In this respect, a variety 
of industrial issues matter, like the degree of 
complementarity of the purchasing and 
production assets, the rent-seeking behaviours of 
the several agents, i.e. those making the choice 
and those applying it for the relevant activities, 
the existence of sunk costs and irreversible 
investments, and the consequent hold-up issue. 
Of course, all the transaction costs concerns, as 
the contractual size and complexity, and the 
time and costs requested for settling the 
eventual controversies on trial are also relevant 
(Williamson 2005). Thus, by limiting the 
opportunistic behaviours and the ex-ante and 
ex-post contract inefficiency, the integration 
will be preferable to a system based on market 
exchanges and transactions. This will happen 
when its advantages can exceed the static and 
dynamic inefficiencies due to huge bureaucratic 
centralised structures, such in the case of public 
administration. 
In a de-integrated (separated) model, as the Dutch 
one, there is a limited degree of industrial 
concentration. A specific Authority, i.e. a 
public Sponsor of citizens, expresses the 
demand for health care on the behalf of 
patients, and establishes the appropriateness of 
treatments. The providers are governmental or 
non-profit institutions, but they must be, in any 
case, appropriately ex-ante selected as “reliable 
providers”. The selection procedure aims both 
at controlling and limiting the provider power 
in the negotiation due to asymmetric 
information problems, and at assuring that the 
several necessities and urgencies of users are 
suitably fulfilled. 
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In a public-public integrated model, like that one 
prevailing in some European countries, there is 
a strong industrial integration, so that planning, 
demand rationing, financing, production, and 
supply of services are unified in one structure, a 
“Local health firm”, as for example the Italian 
Aziende Sanitarie Locali (ASL). In milder 
versions of the model, some hospital firms, 
even if publicly owned, may be separated from 
the “Local health firm”. This semi-integrated 
configuration is wholly working in the UK, 
where there is a Health District Authority 
separated from Trust hospitals, which can be 
almost freely chosen by the patients. 
In conclusion, by also taking into account 
Political economy considerations with respect 
to conflicting relationships, e.g. between 
citizens and politicians and/or public providers 
and pressure groups, a cost-benefit analysis of 
separation versus integration may suggest the 
following pros and cons of the separation in 
the industrial health organization. On the pros 
side, first, separation may provide positive 
incentives coming from the conflict of interests 
between the demand of an ASL and the supply 
of a provider, as an Azienda Ospedaliera. 
However, on the cons side, this may lead to an 
insufficient exploitation of economies of scale 
and scope with respect to an integrated set-up. 
Second, on the pros side, there may be positive 
incentives from competition-quality-choice 
conduct arising from purchasing contracts, 
even if, on the cons side, this may also lead to 
high transaction costs due to signing and 
implementing incomplete contracts. Third, still 
on the pros side, separation may lead to more 
transparent accountancy procedures and better 
performance measures, even if there may be 
difficulties in effectively controlling demand 
and supply. Fourth, separation may guarantees 
a higher level of specialization of the managers 
on insurance (risk and need perception), 
production (measurement and control of costs 
and returns), and purchasing (demand input 
control). However, on the cons side, separation 
may have as a drawback the phenomenon of 
demand induction from providers mainly 
boosted to increase their revenues. Finally, still 
on the pros side, separation may lead to 
improved controls on costs and quality because 
of a Health Authority which acts as “aware 
bidder contractor” and not as “blind 
purchaser”. 
3.3 Quasi markets 
On the basis of such an analysis, we may state 
that quasi-markets, the most advanced form of 
the contractual model,5 are organized on a clear 
separation of structures, i.e. set of national or 
regional authorities regulating public and/or 
private production, a set of agencies conveying 
the users demand and needs, and a set of 
public and/or private health providers. Again, 
by using a cost benefit analysis, we may 
examine such an organizational structure more 
in depth, and summarize its pros and cons. 
On the pros side, first, we may stress the fact 
that by limiting its productive role, the State 
could better concentrate its efforts in 
                                                 
5 For an analysis of an emblematic quasi-market, like the 
English one during Margaret Thatcher’s era, see 
Maynard (1994) and Jones and Cullies (1996). For an 
evaluation of the today English National Health System, 
after Tony Blair partial revisions of the latter, see the 
OECD Report by Smith and Goddard (2009). 
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purchasing health services on the behalf of the 
citizens enrolled in the National Health System. 
Of course, the corresponding cons is that 
cream-skimming procedures by providers could 
take place. Second, as the prices of health 
treatments are generally fixed, stimulating 
competition among providers (especially public 
providers) may have beneficial effects on the 
quality of health treatments. However, on the 
cons side, such a competition requires complex 
ex-ante and ex-post performance controls by a 
public authority which also has to properly 
regulate the internal market with plans, hard 
budgets, efficient bidding and contractual 
activities. Third, the voice of patients-consumers 
can be valued through the role of sponsor 
played by the insurers. On the cons side, this, 
however, could lead to an increase in both 
private and public health expenditure because 
of moral hazard and phenomena of inducing 
distorted demand by highly competitive 
providers engaging to acquire as many 
customers as possible. Fourth, on the pros side, 
patients-consumers may exit, i.e. they have the 
freedom of choosing the preferred provider. 
This may not be always possible when, at least 
in some areas, competition among hospitals is 
simply not possible, so that local monopolies 
arise (industrial configuration failure). Fifth, quasi-
markets may boost cost-containing and quality 
enhancing actions. The drawback of this could 
be that the incentive to increase observable 
features of quality could be matched to the 
incentive to decrease the not observable ones. 
Propper et al. (2008) have shown that Trust 
hospitals competition in NHS has reduced 
average waiting lists (observable feature), but it 
has also increased other no-observable relevant 
features of quality, like death rates. Finally, on 
the pros side, R&D activities in medical 
industries, as hospitals, could be improved 
because being “residual claimant”, hospitals can 
re-invest  their “profits”. On the cons side, 
insuring patients-consumers more freedom of 
choice is somewhat misleading given their 
imperfect information, and the potentially non-
benevolent pay-off and behaviour of the 
physicians prescribing the treatments. 
From this analysis, it turns out that quasi-
markets may be socially desirable in some 
institutional and economic set-ups while they 
may not be desirable in others. Evidence shows 
that only a limited number of European 
countries have reformed their Health Systems 
in pure contractual quasi-markets. Nowadays, 
after several succeeding reforms in the nineties, 
in The Netherlands, UK, Germany, and 
Sweden, quasi-markets which are organized in 
potentially pro-competitive systems are 
prevailing. Instead, in countries like Spain and 
Italy, Health Systems have only adopted some 
elements of managed competition. Indeed, 
although internal competition features were 
supposed to be introduced, at the end, their 
limits have been emphasized, and they have not 
been fully applied. Further, other countries, like 
France, Denmark, and Finland, even if aware 
of the efficiency disadvantages of the purely 
planned systems, have introduced only very 
few or no pro-competitive items at all. 6 
                                                 
6 Notice, however, that in those federal countries where 
health care organization is decentralized at a regional or 
state level, many different health organizational models 
may prevail, as it is indeed the case in Italy where in 
Lombardy there is a quasi-market system while in 
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3.4 The ownership design of the health 
care structures 
The trade-off between cost-containment and 
quality may also affect the institutional design, 
and the ownership options for health 
structures. In particular, the PPP choice could 
be justified in terms of investment tasks’ 
assignment, i.e. the convenience of transferring 
the responsibility for certain elements of the 
treatments to private hands, while maintaining 
other elements in public hands. 
Hoppe and Schmitz (2010) have proposed a 
model of the public or private provision of a 
good (service), where contracts on privatization 
of infrastructures projects, like new hospitals, 
do not only specify the transfer of ownership 
rights, but also assign the responsibility on 
design construction, maintenance, and 
modernization of the structure itself. The main 
results suggested by Hoppe and Schmitz (2010) 
for the health sector are the followings. First, 
partnerships between the public and the private 
sector in running a hospital can be desirable 
when their bargaining power is relatively 
balanced, and the side effects of cost and 
quality innovations are relatively unimportant. 
Second, public (private) ownership should 
instead prevail when the side effects of cost 
(quality) innovations are sufficiently strong. 
Finally, it is important noticing that the private 
bargaining power is inversely related to the 
degree of competition among hospitals. On the 
other side, the government’s bargaining power 
is likely to be ex-post weak because it may be 
                                                                           
Tuscany there is a somewhat command & control 
system. 
difficult to find alternative providers during the 
renegotiation. Furthermore, evidence suggests 
that improving the treatments’ quality highly 
affects a hospital production costs because of 
high costs of more sophisticated equipment. 
Instead, an innovation leading to a decrease in 
costs could imply relatively low side effects on 
quality when the hospital is far from x-
efficiency. 
An intermediate solution to the ownership 
issue for hospitals and other facilities with 
respect to the public/private dichotomy is to 
build up a no-profit organization. Such no-
profit organizations usually pursue aims as 
fairness, education, values’ preservation, etc. 
Since hospital activities have a multi-product 
nature, a no-profit organization may prefer 
some products, i.e. mission-oriented services, 
although privately unprofitable goods, while it 
may not prefer others, i.e. minor services, 
although profitable revenue-goods. However, 
an efficient management of a no-profit hospital 
should take advantage from this by producing 
“no-preferred” goods at the maximum profits 
so to earn resources to finance the production 
of “preferred” goods (Weisbrod, 2006). Such a 
cross-subsidization could be beneficial from a 
second best perspective trying to maximize an 
implicit multidimensional objective function. 
In this respect, evidence on mixed industries, 
mainly hospital, facilities for the mentally 
handicapped, and nursing homes, shows 
behavioural differences in many dimensions as 
in efficiency, mortality rates, satisfaction of 
staff members and among patient’s families. 
For example, Weisbrod (2006) has shown that 
observed behavioural differences across 
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institutional forms reflect two specific 
perspectives: The different constraints that a 
no-profit firm face with respect to a for-profit 
firm, i.e. a “no-distribution constraint” limiting 
the size of profit, and the fact that no-profit 
firms can have access to volunteer labour and 
private donations of money. 
4 SOME EVIDENCE ON THE MIX BETWEEN 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRODUCER-
PROVIDER IN THE HEALTH SECTOR: 
THE NETHERLANDS AND AUSTRALIA 
The Dutch health care system is characterized by a 
majority of private health care providers and 
no-profit hospitals, and since the early 1990s it 
has been characterized by a series of reforms 
which have switched it from a supply-side 
government-regulation towards a regulated 
competition. Following Van de Ven (2012), we 
illustrate the main features of the recent reform 
occurred in 2006 (Health Insurance Act) which 
has obliged every Dutch citizen to buy a private 
health insurance based on open enrollment, 
community rating, and risk equalization. 
Such an health insurance covers a number of 
items which are defined by the law, namely 
primary and specialized health care, 
hospitalization, pharmaceuticals, maternity, 
dental health care for children, and other minor 
items. This type of private insurance has 
substituted the previous system according to 
which 67% of the population had a public 
mandatory health insurance, and the rest of the 
population had a voluntary private insurance. 
Insurance companies have to apply an open 
enrollment, namely they are obliged to insure 
every Dutch citizen (no cream-skimming), and 
they have to apply the same premium to those 
living in the same area for the same type of 
insurance contract according to a community 
rating. The insurance contract can last one year 
at maximum, and after the patient may decide 
whether to remain with the same insurance 
company or to change. Consumers are thus 
free to choose the preferred insurance 
company. However, consumers face a true 
freedom of choice only when transaction costs 
in case of changing the insurance company are 
very low. This could not be the case if the new 
insurance company denies a supplementary 
health insurance to the high-risk individuals 
who would like to buy a mandatory health 
insurance or if the old insurance company asks 
a higher premium for the supplementary health 
insurance to those individuals who do not buy 
anymore the mandatory health insurance from 
it.7 In the Dutch health care system, insurance 
companies receive ex-ante risk-adjusted 
payments to counter the higher health care 
expenditures for elders, and chronically-ill 
patients, but also ex-ante risk-adjusted 
payments based on age, gender, socio-
economic and employment status, etc. Since 
such payments are not sufficient to cover the 
higher expenditures, insurance companies also 
receive some ex-post reimbursements based on 
their true expenditures. 
                                                 
7 Although after the reform insurance companies have 
agreed not to use such cream-skimming procedures, a 
higher percentage of the population (4% in 2006 and 7% 
in 2009) did not take into account the possibility to 
change the insurance company because of the fear to be 
denied a supplementary health insurance by the new 
insurance company for age or health status. 
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All Dutch citizens pay a tax based on their 
income to finance the Fund to equalize risks, 
and a premium to the insurance company (in 
2008, the average premium was 1105 euro per 
year). However, about 2/3 of the Dutch 
families receive a care allowance based on their 
income from the government. Residents below 
18 years old do not have to pay any premium 
because the government cover their health 
expenditures. Patients can also buy a 
supplementary health insurance which covers 
items that are not covered by the mandatory 
health insurance, such as dental care for adults, 
physiotherapy, etc. For such supplementary 
contracts, insurance companies can determine 
the premium with respect to the patient’s risk, 
and cream-skim. In 2010, 87% of the 
population has a supplementary health 
insurance bought from the same insurance 
company providing the mandatory health 
insurance. Insurance companies may also 
propose some premium reductions (for a 
maximum of 10%) for some groups of 
patients, as for example members of unions, 
employees of the same firm, members of sport 
club, etc. In 2009, about 60% of the population 
had a lower group premium of an average of 
7%. 
On the supply side, there is a large freedom in 
contracting: insurance companies can contract 
with the health care providers or integrate with 
them, and the treatments’ prices can now be 
negotiated while before they were completely 
regulated by the government. For example in 
2009, 34% of the hospitals’ total revenues is 
negotiated with the insurance companies. The 
insurance market is considered sufficiently 
contestable because of the presence of several 
independent authorities which are separated 
from the government. In particular, there is a 
first authority that is responsible for the health 
care quality (Inspectie voor de 
Gezondheidszorg); a second authority (The 
Dutch Central Bank and the Authority on 
Financial Markets) responsible for controlling 
that insurance companies have sufficiently 
financial resources to bear their obligations; a 
third authority for ensuring competition and 
avoiding cartels and market dominance 
(Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit) which operates 
together with the Antitrust Authority; a fourth 
authority for the legal protection of consumers, 
for example checking that information 
provided by insurance companies to consumers 
are truthful and complete, that insurance 
contracts supplied on the market obey the 
Dutch legislation, etc. In this respect, in order 
to provide consumers with sufficient 
information on insurance companies and 
health care providers, the government has 
created a web site where consumers can 
compare health insurance contracts supplied by 
different companies with respect to premia, 
health care services, consumer satisfaction, etc., 
and where consumers can also find information 
on performance indicators for hospitals’ 
quality. 
To sum up, the benefits of the 2006 reform 
seem to be the following: A standard package 
of health care treatments for all Dutch 
residents, insurance contracts based on open 
enrollment and community rating, freedom to 
choose the insurance company every year, risk 
equalization mechanism to take into account 
redistributive objectives, strong price 
competition among insurance companies, more 
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information for consumers on health insurance 
contracts and health care providers. On the 
other side, the drawbacks of the reform which 
should be improved in the following years are 
for example the followings: insurance 
companies are reluctant to supply preferred 
providers contracts to consumers, the risk 
equalization mechanism can be improved in 
order to reduce ex-post payments to insurance 
companies that do not push up their efficiency, 
and finally the development of improved 
performance indicators both for the insurance 
companies and the hospitals would be 
desirable. 
Nowadays, Australia is also characterized by a 
mix of private and public financing mechanism 
of the health care system which has followed a 
series of reforms in the last 40 years. Before 
such reforms, namely in 1984, the Australian 
health care system was characterized by a 
voluntary private insurance mechanism (77.6% 
of the population covered in 1971). Following 
Paolucci et al. (2012), we now briefly illustrate 
some main features of the Australian health 
care system after the reform in 1984 and the 
subsequent ones. In 1984, the government 
introduced a public health program, Medicare, 
which is a public national universal health 
insurance financed through general taxation. 
Medicare covers hospitalization in public 
hospitals without costs for the patients, primary 
and specialized health care provided by private 
providers, and it contributes through subsidies 
to a list of treatments included in the Medical 
Benefit Scheme and in the Pharmaceutical  
Benefit Scheme. Following the introduction of 
Medicare, the percentage of the population 
covered by a private health insurance is 
decreased: 50% in 1984 to 30% in 1997. Such 
phenomenon describes a typical “adverse selection 
death spiral” given that low-risk individuals have 
reduced their purchase of private health 
insurances while high-risk individuals, on the 
contrary, have increased their purchase.8 
Together with the introduction of Medicare, 
between 1997 and 2000, the government has 
introduced the following new schemes. First, it 
has introduced the Private Health Insurance 
Incentives Scheme which provides a subsidy of 
30% to those with a private health insurance, 
and a tax with a tax rate of 1% on the 
imposable income to those individuals with 
incomes higher than $70.000 per year 
($140.000 per year for a couple) who have not 
a private insurance. Then it has also introduced 
the Lifetime Health Cover which introduces 
higher premia for those individuals with more 
than 30 years for each year after the thirtieth 
without a private health insurance. Following 
such reforms, the percentage of the population 
who has bought a private health insurance has 
increased, and the risk profile of those 
individuals purchasing a private health 
insurance has also improved, even if the 
“adverse selection death spiral” still persists also 
because of the extension to the long-term care 
to private health insurance, and higher 
discounts on the premia for the elders. 
The introduction of subsidies and regulations 
in order to favour the enrollment in private 
                                                 
8 For example, during the period between 1984 and 
1998, elders (>70 years) increased their purchase (from 
31% to 37%) while youngers (25 years<age<34 years) 
decreased their purchase (from 46% to 22%). 
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health insurance has been justified with respect 
to reducing cream-skimming, and positive 
externalities coming from a higher coverage. 
From a political point of view, the government 
hoped to reduce health public expenditure by 
increasing private coverage which could have 
decreased the use of Medicare. However, this 
did not occur: although the number of 
individuals purchasing a private health 
insurance increased, in the last ten years, the 
total amount of private health expenditure 
decreased meaning that those individuals, who 
have both the public and the private coverage, 
use the former. Thus, taking into account also 
the public subsidies in favour of private 
insurance purchasing, public health 
expenditures increased. Another drawback of 
the present system is linked to the existence of 
perverse effects in terms of waiting lists due to 
the fact that the public sector has not enough 
incentives to reduce them hoping that the 
patients will thus choose a private provider. 
In order to improve the present health system 
several proposals have been made. In 
particular, it has been proposed to eliminate the 
present partial duplication in coverage for 
private health insurance holders either by 
allowing individuals to “opt-out” from 
Medicare or by confining private health 
insurance to a supplementary insurance with 
respect to the mandatory public one. Further, it 
has been proposed to substitute the present 
subsidies for purchasing private health 
insurance by ex-ante risk-adjusted subsidies of 
the type of those used in The Netherlands. 
5 EDUCATIONAL SECTOR: PRIVATE/PUBLIC 
PARTNERSHIPS AND COMPETITION 
MECHANISMS 
Even if the educational sector is under the state 
supervision in basically all countries, there are 
wide differences in the mix of its 
public/private provision and financing across 
them. The following table categorizes four 
possible cases stressing the importance of 
separating financing of education from its 
provision. 
 
Table 2. Public/private financing and 
provision of education 
 Private 
provision 
Public 
provision 
Private 
financing 
Pure private 
schools 
User fees 
Student loans 
Private finance 
initiative (PFI) 
Public 
financing 
Vouchers 
Contracting 
out 
Student loans 
Traditional 
public schools 
Source: Patrinos and Sosale (2007). 
On the one extreme, we have the pure private 
school system where both financing and 
provision are private while, on the other 
extreme, we have the traditional pure public 
school system where both financing and 
provision are public. The other two cases are 
based on a collaboration between public and 
private entities, which according to 
Woessmann (2009) can be both referred to as 
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PPPs. However, in a first case, for-profit or not 
(e.g. religious) private schools are publicly 
financed, while in a second case, schools are 
managed by a public entity but are privately 
financed (e.g. by tuition fees). Based on such a 
classification, we can maintain that the majority 
of OECD countries have a purely public 
system, but an average public expenditure of 
12% is in favour of educational institutions 
which are privately managed (Patrinos et al. 
2009). Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, and Denmark are examples 
of such first type of PPP, with Australia, 
Canada, France (Catholic schools), Japan, and 
the United Kingdom using vouchers for private 
school participation while Mexico is an 
example of the second type. 
Even if PPPs in education are a much-debated 
topic, systematic theoretical and empirical 
analyses are still few. On the one hand, 
theoretical analyses points out which are the 
pro and cons of PPPs in the case of 
institutional set-ups characterized by more and 
more binding financial constraints. On the 
other hand, evidence is usually in the form of 
case-studies, with some recent works trying to 
estimate the impact of PPPs on outcomes, such 
as students’ achievements, enrollment, 
education inequality, and costs (see the next 
section). 
Let us now concentrate our attention on the 
first type of PPP, namely private schools 
receiving public financing. The arguments in 
favor of such a scheme can be summarized as 
follows (Patrinos et al. (2009), LaRocque, 2009). 
First, the existence of both public and private 
provision allows parents to choose the type of 
school for their children with more freedom in 
accordance with their preferences (Friedman, 
1955). Second, the coexistence of public and 
private provision creates a quasi-market, and 
competition among schools can increase the 
quality of education provided. Third, market 
forces may foster cost containment. Usually 
private providers are chosen through an open 
bidding process: the contract specifies the 
quality of education required and the best 
proposal in terms of costs is then chosen. 
Further, PPP contracts clearly assign 
responsibilities between the financier and the 
provider, identify objectives and outputs, and 
can better fit changes in the demand for 
education because private schools have more 
autonomy than public schools in hiring 
teachers and in running their organization. 
Fourth, PPP contracts may allow a higher level 
of risk sharing between the public sector and 
the private one. 
On the contrary, the arguments against private 
provision of education financed by public 
funds stress the following points. First, PPPs 
can create socioeconomic segregation among 
students with the high-ability and/or richer 
students enrolled in the high-quality schools 
and the low-ability and/or poorer students 
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enrolled in the low-quality schools. Second, the 
quality of the public school may decrease by 
enrolling mostly low-ability and/or poorer 
students (see also peer-group effects). Third, 
costs may not decrease because the public 
sector has to spend more on writing different 
types of contracts (e.g. for management, 
educational services, infrastructures), and on 
running independent authorities to monitor the 
contracts’ implementation (e.g. curricula, 
quality of education, quality of infrastructures, 
etc.). Fourth, private schools may be less prone 
to promote among the students ideological and 
cultural values that the government would like 
to be pursued. Fifth, bidding procedures may 
foster corruption. 
The importance of each pro and cons depends 
on the type of PPP contract that the public 
sector decides to implement. In this respect, we 
now analyze the main features of PPP 
contracts. First of all, contracting can be 
defined as «the process whereby a government 
procures education or education-related 
services of a defined quantity and quality at an 
agreed price from a specific provider. The 
agreement between the funder and the service 
provider is recorded in a contract and is valid 
for a specified period of time» (Patrinos et al. 
(2009) p. 9). In particular, there exist different 
types of PPP contracts depending on the type 
of service that the public financier buys from 
the private sector, as it is shown in the table 
No. 3. 
The object of the contract can be inputs, such 
as school management, support services, 
professional services or infrastructure and 
building maintenance; it can be the process of 
education, for instance, managing and 
operating public schools; it can also be outputs, 
by enrolling specific students in private 
schools. Depending on the type of object, the 
contract has different features that we now 
specify in more details following Patrinos and 
Sosale (2007). 
Contracts for management, professional services, support 
services 
Contracts for management services usually 
concern financial management, staff 
management, and leadership while public 
sector employees continue to perform all non-
managerial functions. On the one side, 
potential benefits of this type of contracts are 
linked to the bidding procedure to select the 
private organization that will be in charge to 
provide the managerial services, the reduction 
in bureaucratic and union constraints of the 
public sector, and the higher freedom to 
manage of the private managers.  
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Table 3. Types of PPP contracts in education 
What governments 
contract for 
What governments buy Contract type 
Management, professional, 
support services (inputs) 
• School management (financial 
and human resources 
management) 
• Professional services (teacher 
training, curriculum design, 
textbook delivery, quality 
assurance, and supplemental 
services) 
• Support services (meals and 
transportation) 
• Management contracts 
 
 
• Professional services 
contracts 
 
 
 
• Support services 
contracts 
Education services (outputs) • Student places in private schools 
(by contracting with schools to 
enroll specific students) 
• Contracts for education 
of specific students 
Facility availability (inputs) • Infrastructure and building 
maintenance 
• Infrastructure services 
contracts 
Facility availability and 
education services (both 
inputs and outputs) 
• Infrastructure combined with 
services (operational or 
educational outputs) 
• Infrastructure and 
education services 
contracts 
Operational services 
(process) 
• The education of students, 
financial and human resources 
management, professional 
services, and building 
maintenance 
• Operational services 
contracts 
Source: Patrinos et al. (2009). 
However, on the other side, asymmetric 
information problems make very difficult to 
specify in advance the features of the required 
managerial services, and to monitor the 
managers’ performance given that it is hard to 
disentangle the contribution of managers from 
all other factors to a school performance. 
Contracts for professional services can regard 
activities such as teacher training, curriculum 
design, and quality certification while contracts 
for support services usually concern non-
instructional services such as pupil 
transportation, school meals, and building 
maintenance. The latter services are contracted 
out very often in public education systems. 
Potential benefits come from the fact that 
support services contracts are easier to design 
because it is relatively easy to specify the 
features of the required inputs in contractual 
terms, to monitor the quality of the provided 
services, to sanction the contractor if it fails to 
respect the contract. Further, cost-effectiveness 
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may increase because of the bidding procedure 
to select the contractor, and economies of scale 
coming from the fact that one contractor 
usually serves many schools. Contracts for 
professional services may be less easier 
designed with respect to the previous ones, but 
potential benefits may come from the fact that 
school employees can have more time to 
devote to educational core services. 
Contracts for education of specific students 
Contrary to the Italian case, in some countries, 
public schools may not supply specialized 
services for specific students with some 
disadvantage which, instead, are provided by 
private schools. In these cases, contracts may 
be designed so that the public sector buys an 
output, namely it pays the enrollment of 
specific students in private schools. Potential 
benefits from these agreements may come 
from the competitive process through which 
private schools are chosen, and a higher 
education quality public financed students 
receive when no-profit schools are willing to 
subsidize these students via the tuition fees 
paid by privately funded students. 
Contracts for infrastructure services 
On the one hand, these type of contract may 
be appealing for the public sector especially 
when public finances are stressed because the 
private sector finance and construct facilities 
that the government pay for over time. On the 
other hand, these type of contract may be not 
appealing for private investors because of 
political risks associated to changing legislators 
and/or public policies. Further, asymmetric 
information problems on capital costs of the 
infrastructure may lead to increases in the cost 
with respect to the one quantified at the outset. 
As it is shown in the table n. 4, contracts can 
differ a lot with respect to the arrangements 
between the public and the private sector, but 
all of them share some common features. 
Some main common features of PPP contracts 
for infrastructures are the following: the 
contract has usually a long-term (25/30 years), 
and specifies the services that the private sector 
must deliver, their quality level, and payments; 
a competitive tender process selects the private 
investor; the private sector invests in the school 
infrastructure, provides related services as 
building maintenance, and may also provide 
some nonteaching staff; the public sector 
provides the core service (teaching). Contrary 
to traditional procurement methods, with PPP 
contracts, the capital needed to finance the 
infrastructure is provided by the private sector; 
the contract specifies the output and not the 
input required by the public sector; as soon as 
the infrastructure is built, its ownership is 
retained by the private sector, and only at the 
end of the concession it is passed to the public 
sector (LaRocque, 2009). The most common 
contract is the build-operate-transfer: the 
private investor finances, builds, and operates a 
school (or other infrastructures such as 
laboratories) for a given period of time during 
which the school is leased to the public sector 
for a certain rental. At the end of that period, 
the ownership of the school building is turned 
over to the government. 
 
  
 
Table 4. Different PPP contracts for infrastructures 
Type of partnership Features 
Traditional design and 
build 
The government contracts with a private partner to design and build a 
facility to specific requirements 
Operations and 
maintenance 
The government contracts with a private partner to operate a publicly 
owned facility 
Turnkey operation The government provides financing, the private partner designs, 
constructs, and operates facility for a specified time period, while the 
public partner retains ownership of facility 
Lease-purchase The private partner leases a facility to the government for a specified 
time of period, after which ownership is vested with government 
Lease or own-develop-
operate 
The private partner leases or buys a facility from the government and 
develops and operates the facility under contract to the government for 
a specified time period 
Build-operate-transfer 
(BOT) 
The private partner obtains an exclusive contract to finance, build, 
operate, maintain, manage, and collect user fees for a facility for a fixed 
period to amortize its investment, and at the end of the franchise, the 
title reverts to the government 
Build-own-operate The government either transfers ownership and responsibility for an 
existing facility or contracts with a private partner to build, own, and 
operate new facility in perpetuity 
Source: Patrinos and Sosale (2007). 
 
Contracts for infrastructure and education services 
(comprehensive contracts) 
These type of contract have been used in the 
health sector, but not in the educational sector. 
The private sector invests in the infrastructure, 
and then it also runs it. This requires that two 
contracts have to be signed. The private sector 
should have more incentives to be involved in  
investing in the infrastructure (and paying 
interest rates usually higher with respect to 
those of the public sector) when it also has the  
 
guarantee that it will be able to provide the 
service for a given period of time. 
Contracts for operational services 
Under this type of contract, the operation of a 
public school is entirely contracted out to the 
private sector. Usually this type of contract is 
addressed to disadvantage areas where the 
public school does not perform well, and 
providing more school autonomy may lead to 
improvements in the quality of education. 
Often the operation of the school by the 
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private sector is accompanied by the 
involvement of local communities through 
building or improving of existing facilities. 
6 SOME EVIDENCE ON THE MIX BETWEEN 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRODUCER-
PROVIDER IN THE EDUCATIONAL 
SECTOR: ENGLAND, THE USA, THE 
NETHERLANDS 
Woessmann (2009) has shown the positive 
impact of PPPs on the quality of education, i.e. 
on students’ achievements measured by 
students’ cognitive skills. His econometric 
analysis is carried on across OECD countries,9 
and it allows investigating whether the 
existence of private schools may positively 
affect the performance of nearby public 
schools because of a quasi-market 
configuration. The sample size used counts at 
an average of 4,500 students in 168 schools per 
country. Data concerning public vs. private 
provision and public vs. private financing of 
schools are obtained by the PISA database of 
the year 2000.10 
Woessmann’s main results show that PPPs 
which combine public funding with private 
provision perform more than one third of an 
international standard deviation better than 
                                                 
9 Out of 32 developed and emerging countries, 29 are 
used in the paper. Australia, Canada, and Liechtenstein 
are excluded, the first two because their data were not 
complete, the third one because too few schools were 
tested. 
10 PISA is an international test conducted by OECD on 
random samples of 15-year-old students. It tests 
students’ performance in reading, math, and science. 
pure public systems. On the contrary, PPPs 
which combine private funding with public 
provision perform worse than purely public 
systems. Further, there are no differences in 
students’ average performance in systems 
which combine high share of public funding 
with high share of public provision, and 
systems which combine high share of private 
funding with high share of private provision. 
Thus, the conclusion which can be drawn from 
this analysis suggests that PPPs in the form of 
public financing with both public and private 
provision seem to have the greater impact on 
cognitive abilities of students. Let us now 
analyse some examples where such policies 
have been implemented. 
Starting with England, we may notice that there 
are three types of schools: private schools 
which are highly influential, paid by tuition 
fees, and attended by a small percentage of the 
population; public schools which charge no 
fees; and for-profit and not-for-profit schools 
attended by specific pupils whose fees are paid 
by the public sector. England has experienced 
PPP contracts mainly through infrastructure 
service contracts, namely Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI), and through the introduction 
of academy schools. 
PFI was introduced by the Conservative 
government in 1992, and then it was supported 
by the Labor government since 1997. Typically, 
the private sector finances, builds, and manages 
the school infrastructure under a contract that 
last 25/30 years while teaching activities are left 
to the public sector. However, given the long 
term and highly complicated nature of such 
PFI contracts, it seems too difficult to discern 
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the true costs and benefits for the public sector 
(McIntosh, 2007). In other areas where PFI 
contracts have shown to produce positive 
results, the private sector typically both runs 
the service and maintain the infrastructure 
while the separation of such functions in the 
educational sector can potentially give rise to 
conflicting relationships between the private 
and the public sector. For this reason, a new 
program has been proposed, Building Schools 
for the Future (BSF) which is based not only 
on the private sector participation to the 
financing of schools’ plants but also on a local 
education partnership (LEP) between local 
governments and private contractors to 
manage schools. However, given that local 
governments can opt for different degrees of 
private sector participation in the LEP, it is 
difficult to draw general conclusions on this 
point (McIntosh (2007)). 
To show now how the still very popular 
Academy model introduced by the Labor 
government in 2002 works, in what follows, we 
refer to the paper by Machin and Vernoit 
(2011). However, to appreciate the main 
features of such a model, we analyse it within 
the English secondary education system which 
is based on six different types of schools 
characterized by a different involvement of the 
three main actors: private, voluntary, and public 
ones. 
Independent schools have the higher degree of 
autonomy. They are privately funded by tuition 
fees, managed by a body that establishes all the 
activities concerning the school, such as the 
curriculum, the admission policies of pupils, 
and the total budget. 
Contrary to independent schools, since academy 
schools have a public status, they cannot charge 
tuition fees, but apart from this, they share all 
other features with independent schools.11 
Their management body is autonomous in 
setting the majority of the curriculum (except 
English, Mathematics, and other few core 
subjects), the time schedule, and the budget. 
They are also autonomous in all staffing 
decisions. They can hire teachers provided that 
they possess the national qualification, they can 
set wages, career development, and working 
conditions on the basis of the specific features 
of the school. They are all-ability schools apart 
from at most 10% of their intake. A 
government agency (the Office for Standard in 
Education – Ofsted) verifies the compliance of 
academy schools with minimum standards and 
publish both their evaluations and the results of 
standardized learning tests. 
City technology colleges were firstly introduced in 
1988 to allow the public sector to establish 
partnership with the private sector in the 
educational sector. They share all features with 
academy schools except that they do not have 
autonomy on the curriculum so they have to 
follow the national one. Their curriculum has 
also a technological target while this is not the 
case for academy schools. 
The other three types of schools (voluntary-aided 
schools, foundation schools, voluntary-controlled schools) 
are characterized by a partnership between the 
public sector and the no-profit sector. In 
voluntary-aided schools their management 
                                                 
11 They are financed by the central government and 
some private sponsors (Ichino and Tabellini, 2014). 
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body can only set some educational policies so, 
for example, they can set staffing decisions, but 
the curriculum is out of its control (the national 
curriculum has to be followed). Foundation 
schools share all characteristics with the 
previous ones, except that the majority sponsor 
cannot appoint the governing body, while 
voluntary-controlled schools share all 
characteristics with foundation schools except 
that they cannot set policies concerning 
admissions of pupils which, instead, are under 
the control of the Local Education Authority. 
At the end of the list, we find local community 
schools which have a very low degree of 
autonomy given that they are completely 
controlled by the Local Educational Authority. 
The period between the 2002 (year of the 
introduction of academy schools) and the 2009 
has shown a some important changes in the 
structure of the secondary school system. The 
importance of community schools declined 
from 64% to 52% while both academy schools 
and foundation schools increased their role, 
from 0.1% to 4% and from 15% to 24%, 
respectively. Concerning academy schools, 
their creation is mainly due to reasons such as 
to augment parental choice by providing more 
school diversity or improving standards in the 
lowest attaining schools. In the latter case, pre-
existing schools can apply to be converted in 
academy schools. After the path to establish an 
academy school is completed12, if the academy 
needs new buildings, these are built. Then it 
starts to receive public funds on the basis of 
                                                 
12 See Machin and Vernoit (2011) for all the details on 
this point. 
the enrolled pupils’ number, and all decisions 
on school policies are passed from the local 
authority to the academy trust. 
Based on their econometric analysis, Machin 
and Vernoit conclude that the creation of 
academy schools has led to an increase in the 
quality of their pupil intake, and an increase in 
their pupil’s performance. The creation of 
academy schools seem also to have led to some 
positive externalities in favor of the 
neighboring schools which registered increases 
in their pupils’ performance although the 
quality of their pupil’s intake decreased.13 These 
positive results seem also to be larger for those 
schools which have been academies for longer 
and for those which obtained higher degrees of 
autonomy. Finally, according to the authors, 
these results could suggest that the 
introduction of academies allows to improve 
the rich/poor achievement gap given that 
academy schools enroll a higher proportion of 
both poor and low performing pupils with 
respect to other school types. 
In the USA in the 2009-2010 school year 4638 
charter schools exist for more than 1.6 million of 
students especially in large urban areas (Fryer, 
                                                 
13 Such positive external effects have not been found, 
instead, by Clark (2009) in a paper which analyses 
another UK educational reform, namely that occurred in 
1988 which allowed public secondary schools to “opt 
out” of the control of the Local Education Authority, to 
become quasi-independent “grant maintained” (GM) 
schools directly receiving funds from the central 
government. His results on improvements in enrollment 
and pupil quality of GM schools is in line with that by 
Machin and Vernoit (2011). 
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2011, Finn and Vanourek, 2007).14 Charter 
schools are similar to UK academy schools. 
They share common features across the nation, 
but are regulated by each state. In particular, 
they receive public funds together with private 
donations, and cannot collect tuition fees. 
However, they are privately runned: they have a 
high degree of autonomy in the sense that they 
can set curricula, hire and fire teachers, and 
determine their salary. However, they cannot 
select students, and for example in New York 
if a charter school has more applicants with 
respect to its places, it has to hold a lottery 
among the applicants (Hoxby and Murarka, 
2009). For each pupil enrolled into a charter 
school, this receives a fee which is tax financed 
so that charter schools have incentives to 
attract more students and parents can “vote 
with their feet”. To convert a school into a 
charter one or to create a new one, initial 
approval has to be obtained from an authorizer 
(a licensing body) which awards a performance 
contract, and can renew or not the charter after 
a certain period of time (usually five years). The 
charter contract is an agreement between a 
school board which can be made of parents, 
educators, entrepreneurs or a mix of them, and 
a public authority, e.g. the local educational 
agency, or a university. The sponsor has to 
evaluate whether the contract’s objectives are 
reached and, if they are not, it can even require 
that the school is closed (Ichino and Tabellini, 
2014). 
                                                 
14 For a theoretical analysis of quasi markets in the U.S. 
educational sector and the role of vouchers, see Nechyba 
(2009). 
Charter schools attract especially disadvantages 
students. For example, in New York, charter 
schools are in neighborhoods with high 
percentage of black and Hispanic residents, 
enrolled pupils belong to families with low 
incomes and have parents with low educational 
attainment (Hoxby and Murarka, 2009). In 
general, charter schools have been introduced 
to pursue several aims such as improving the 
achievements of struggling pupils, increasing 
parental involvement and community support, 
leveraging private capital and fostering 
entrepreneurialism, increasing efficiency by 
means of the market forces (Finn and 
Vanourek, 2007). 
Some recent papers have analyzed the 
effectiveness of charter schools in improving 
pupils’ achievements. For example, 
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2009) by using data from 
Boston, show that large and significant test 
score gains for pupils attending in middle and 
secondary charter schools. These author also 
show that the greatest improvements were 
obtained by those pupils performing 
particularly poorly before starting to be 
enrolled in a charter school. By using a data set 
on Massachusetts charter schools, Angrist et al. 
(2011) show that charter schools seem to have 
different effects on pupils’ performance 
depending on whether they operate in urban or 
non-urban areas. In the case of urban areas, the 
authors show that achievements of students of 
charter schools are well beyond those of urban 
non-charter students, while in the case of non-
urban areas, charter schools seem to be 
ineffective and in some cases they seem to 
worsen pupils’ achievements. The reason for 
this result seems to be linked to the different 
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student demographics between urban and non-
urban areas. In urban areas, charter schools 
enroll a high proportion of minority pupils 
coming from poor families, and with a low 
achievement level. For these types of students, 
charter schools seem more effective in 
improving pupils’ achievements by keeping 
students in school longer and by using different 
pedagogical teaching activities. For New York 
city, Hoxby and Murarka (2009) show that 
charter schools attract more poorer pupils with 
respect to public schools. They show the 
existence of a correlation (not a causation) 
between charter schools’ policies and their 
effects on pupils’ achievements, as for example 
a longer school year and thus also longer 
school day. 
Another important case is that of the 
Netherlands, where schools are highly publicly 
financed15, but most of them are privately 
administered (74% according to Woessmann, 
2009). The Dutch educational system is based 
on a high degree of freedom in establishing 
schools and in choosing the preferred school 
by parents. The government favors such school 
choice by parents as a way to promote 
competition among schools, and thus to foster 
better performances (Patrinos et al., 2009). The 
level of school autonomy is very high both for 
setting curricula and assessment practices, and 
for resource allocation (OECD, 2010). From 
the latter point of view, most schools are 
responsible for determining and allocating 
                                                 
15 The percentage of public expenditure is 86.8% for 
primary, secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education and 98.7% for pre-primary education 
(Education at Glance, 2012). 
resources and for hiring and dismissing 
teachers. However, public and private schools 
are controlled by the central government which 
sets the educational policy. Students perform 
very high scores both on TIMMS and PISA, 
even after controlling for national income and 
per-student expenditure. However, notice that 
while for primary education, the Dutch per-
student annual expenditure is in line with the 
OECD average, it is higher at the secondary 
level, with the Netherlands being among the 
ten countries with the highest teachers’ salaries 
at the secondary level (OECD, 2012). 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has revised the main issues 
concerning the public-private mix in the 
financing-provision of both health and 
education services, and it has illustrated the 
case of some countries which have experienced 
recent pro-competitive reforms in such sectors. 
Re-thinking the role of the public sector in 
both the health and the educational systems 
seems a growing phenomenon in several 
countries, and recent proposals on education 
have been also made for Italy (see Ichino and 
Tabellini, 2014). However such phenomena are 
still in their infancy so that rigorous empirical 
analyses on the effectiveness of such reforms 
are quite few. Although most of the analyses 
examine specific case studies, they can provide 
interesting lessons by enlightening which are 
the success and the problematic factors. In 
particular, we can remark the importance of an 
enabling policy and regulatory environment 
and a strong legal framework (LaRocque, 
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2009). The contracting approach calls for a 
good policy design, transparent and 
competitive bidding procedures, and well-
managed implementation. In particular, it is 
necessary that regulatory public agencies are 
able to design, monitor, and enforce complex 
contracts. To perform such tasks they need 
information, skills, and appropriate quantitative 
and qualitative indicators in order to evaluate 
the performance of the service providers, and 
to establish penalties for failures and rewards 
for success.16 
  
                                                 
16 Grazzini L., Petretto A., Public-Private Partnership and 
competition in Health-Care and Education. DOI: 
10.12870/iar-10198 
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